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Abstract
We consider a group of receivers who share a common prior on a finite state space
and who observe private correlated signals that are contingent on the true state of
the world. We show that, while necessary, Bayes plausibility is not sufficient for a
distribution over posterior belief vectors to be inducible, and we provide a character-
ization of inducible distributions. We classify communication strategies as minimal,
direct, and language independent, and show that any inducible distribution can be
induced by a language independent communication strategy (LICS). We investigate
the role of the different classes of communication strategies for the amount of higher
order information that is revealed to receivers. We show that the least informative
communication strategy which induces a fixed distribution over posterior belief vec-
tors lies in the relative interior of the set of all language independent communication
strategies which induce that distribution.
Keywords: Information Design, Inducible Distributions, Informativeness.
1 Introduction
In any economic model which involves a group of agents and has a payoff structure that
depends on the posterior beliefs of the agents, one of the essential questions is “Which
distributions over posterior beliefs of agents can be induced?” In their seminal paper,
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Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) consider communication between a sender and a receiver
who share a common prior and show that the only restriction on the set of inducible
distributions over posterior belief vectors is Bayes plausibility: the expected posterior
belief is equal to the prior.1 It follows from their insight that Bayes plausibility and
identical beliefs is necessary and sufficient in the case of multiple receivers and public
communication, that is, when messages are perfectly correlated. Yet, in this case the set
of inducible distributions over posteriors is very limited since all receivers have the same
ex-post belief. In the present paper we are interested in private communication, which, in
contrast, enables the sender to achieve a richer belief space; however, Bayes plausibility
is no longer sufficient for inducibility. In other words, there are distributions which are
Bayes plausible for every agent, but are not induced by any communication strategy. The
first question we answer is: what additional conditions are required for the existence of
such a communication strategy?
Another aspect which is important for both the sender and receivers is the informative-
ness of a communication strategy. While the informativeness criterion which is commonly
employed in the information design literature is the one of Blackwell (1953), we consider
a different definition of informativeness: we compare the informativeness of communi-
cation strategies not in terms of ex-post beliefs but in terms of “knowledge” about the
true state and the signal realization in the sense of Hintikka (1962). A signal realization
induces information partitions that determine what a receiver knows about another re-
ceiver’s knowledge of the true state and the signal realization. This becomes particularly
important if the sender wishes to restrict the information receivers have about each other.
The second main question we answer is: what types of communication strategies are the
least informative?
We consider a sender who commits to a communication strategy that sends private
correlated messages to the receivers. Receivers know the joint the distribution of signals,
that is vectors of messages, but they only observe their own private message from the signal
realization. We first show that there are posterior belief vectors, which the sender cannot
achieve with positive probability. More precisely, for a given posterior belief vector, there
exists a communication strategy that induces a distribution which puts positive weight
on it if and only if there exists a state which is deemed possible by all receivers according
to this belief vector. As an example, consider an operative who follows Machiavelli’s
advice divide et impera and, thus, wants to create political unrest in a foreign country by
implementing a very heterogeneous belief vector. Suppose that there are only two states,
say blue and red. Then it is impossible for the operative to implement a distribution that
puts positive weight on a posterior belief vector in which one receiver believes the state is
blue with probability 1 and another receiver beliefs that the state is red with probability
1. At the same time, a posterior belief vector in which the first receiver’s belief that the
state is blue is equal to 1, and the second receiver’s belief is arbitrarily close to 0 can be
1This is also known as the martingale property.
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achieved with positive probability.
We next define particular classes of communication strategies. We first consider mini-
mal communication strategies under which distinct signals lead to distinct posterior belief
vectors. While this ensures that no two signals implement the same posterior belief vec-
tor, there might still be individual receivers for whom different messages lead to the same
posterior. If for each receiver every posterior is induced by a unique message, the com-
munication strategy is called direct. If, additionally, the sent messages are themselves
posteriors such that each message induces itself, we call the communication strategies
language independent (LICS). Here, a sender simply tells the receivers what belief they
should have, and the messages are sent with probabilities such receivers will believe the
message. We show that restricting attention to language independent communication
strategies is without loss of generality, that is, any posterior distribution that can be
induced, can be induced by an LICS.
As mentioned before, in the presence of multiple receivers Bayes plausibility is nec-
essary but not sufficient for a distribution to be inducible. We characterize the set of
inducible distributions of posteriors by showing that a Bayes plausible distribution is in-
ducible if and only if there exists a matrix p with non-negative entries which satisfies
a particular system of linear equations. In particular, the set of matrices that satisfy
these equations is a convex polytope, which implies that the set of language independent
communication strategies that induce a given distribution over posterior belief vectors is
a convex polytope as well.
We next explore the informativeness of different communication strategies which in-
duce the same distribution of posterior beliefs: the message a receiver obtains reveals not
only information about the true state of the world, but also about the information that
other receivers have. Let’s return to our operative who wants to create chaos in a foreign
country. If one receiver knew that another receiver knew whether the true state is red
or blue, he might decide not to engage in an argument at all. Thus, our operative might
want to reveal as little information as possible to any receiver about what other receivers
know. As an example suppose that before the operative engages, two receivers believe
that either state might be true with probability 1/2. Suppose the operative engages in
private communication with both and sends signals as follows.
π′ (m, r) (m, b) (x, x)
Red 1
2
0 1
2
Blue 0 1
2
1
2
In this case receiver 2 knows that the true state is red if he observes r, he knows the true
state is blue if he observes b, and he learns nothing if he observes x. Agent 1 never learns
anything about the true state. If he observes m, however, he knows that receiver 2 knows
the true state. If the sender would replace m by x, receiver 1 would not learn anything
at all.
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This example illustrates that the knowledge a receiver has about the true state and
the signal realization can differ among communication strategies under which all receivers
have an identical distribution over posterior belief vectors. In particular, a receiver may
have different knowledge about another receiver’s knowledge about the true state and the
signal realization. It is then natural to ask what types of communication strategies that
induce the same distribution restrict this knowledge the most. In the example above,
different messages might lead to the same posterior belief but to different higher order
knowledge. By employing direct or even language independent communication strategies
we could avoid this issue. But even then: not all language independent communication
strategies reveal the same amount of information. To make this more precise, we define
information correspondences that describe what receivers know about the true state and
the true posterior belief vector (instead of the signal realization), where we call a tuple
of a state and a posterior belief vector a posterior history. A communication strategy is
more informative than another if for every receiver, every state, and every signal that can
occur in this state, the set of posterior histories that the receiver deems possible is smaller
under the former than under the latter. We prove that for any inducible distribution over
posterior belief vectors the least informative communication strategies that induce it lie
in the relative interior of the set of all language independent communication strategies
that induce it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Subsection 1.1 we discuss related lit-
erature. In Section 2 we provide preliminary definitions and results. We then characterize
sets of belief vectors that can be a subset of the support of an inducible distribution over
posterior belief vectors in Section 3. In Section 4 we introduce minimal and direct com-
munication strategies and in Section 5 we turn to language independent communication
strategies. In Section 6 we characterize inducible distributions of posteriors and provide
several implications. Section 7 introduces information and posterior correspondences and
in Section 8 we explore the informativeness of communication strategies.
1.1 Related Literature
Regarding the part of the paper where we focus on inducible distributions of posteriors,
the closest study to ours is Arieli et al. (2020). They consider multiple receivers who
share a common prior belief on a binary state space and study joint posterior belief
distributions. They first show that for the case of two receivers a quantitative version of
the Agreement Theorem of Aumann (1976) holds; beliefs of receivers are approximately
equal when they are approximately common knowledge. For more than two receivers,
they relate the feasibility condition to the No Trade Theorem of Milgrom and Stokey
(1982) and provide a characterization of feasible joint posteriors. These characterizations
are then applied to study independent joint posterior belief distributions. While we pose
the same question as Arieli et al. (2020), we obtain a completely different characterization
while allowing for an arbitrary finite state space.
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Another related paper is Ziegler (2019), which also considers feasible joint posteriors
and follows a similar approach to Arieli et al. (2020). While the author also provides a
characterization of feasible joint posteriors, Arieli et al. (2020) show that the necessary
and sufficient condition provided by Ziegler (2019) becomes insufficient if the support of
the marginal distributions contains more than two points.
In the single receiver case, introducing heterogeneity may render Bayes plausibility
insufficient for a distribution to be inducible. Alonso and Camara (2016) consider a single
receiver who does not share a common prior with the sender, and show that an additional
condition is required on top of Bayes plausibility. Beauchêne et al. (2019) also consider
a single receiver, who is ambiguity averse, and a sender who may use an ambiguous
communication device. In that case they are able to show that a modified version of
Bayes plausibility holds.
When there are multiple receivers, if information is perfectly correlated then Bayes
plausibility is still the only condition for inducibility since in this case all receivers have
the same ex-post belief. The first part of Wang (2013) and Alonso and Câmara (2016)
both consider public communication and are examples of such a situation.
There is a wide literature that focuses on informativeness in the sense of Blackwell
(1953).2 Rick (2013) considers an informed sender and an uninformed receiver and shows
that miscommunication expands the set of distributions of beliefs the sender expects to
induce. Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) consider multiple senders and a single receiver
and show that the amount of revealed information increases with the number of senders.
Ichihashi (2019) considers a single sender and receiver where a designer can restrict the
most informative signal that the sender can generate and characterizes the information
restriction that maximizes the receiver’s payoff. While these papers compare the informa-
tiveness of different information structures by investigating the induced distributions of
posteriors, we analyze informativeness according to the higher order knowledge a receiver
has about the posterior history.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of receivers and Ω a finite set of states of the world. For
any set X denote by ∆(X) the set of probability distributions over X with finite support.
For finite X denote by ∆o(X) the set of probability distribution over X with full support.
We assume that sender and receivers share a common prior belief λ0 ∈ ∆o(Ω).
Let Si be a non-empty set of messages sender can send to receiver i ∈ N and let
S =
∏
i∈N Si. The elements of S are called signals. A communication strategy is a function
π : Ω→ ∆ (S) that maps each ω ∈ Ω to a finite probability distribution over S. The set
2Li (2017) considers a different criterion and measures informativeness in the sense of Ganuza and
Penalva (2010), i.e. that more informative signals lead to greater variability of conditional expectations.
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of possible signal realizations is denoted by Sπ = {s ∈ S| ∃ω ∈ Ω : π(s|ω) > 0} . Note that
receiver i ∈ N knows the joint distributions π (·|ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, but only observes his
private message si when signal s realizes. Denote the set of all communication strategies
by Π. For each π ∈ Π, si ∈ Si, and ω ∈ Ω, let
πi(si|ω) =
∑
t∈S:ti=si
π(t|ω),
which is the probability that receiver i ∈ N observes si given that the true state is ω.
For each i ∈ N, define Sπi = {si ∈ Si| ∃ω ∈ Ω : πi(si|ω) > 0}, which is the set of messages
receiver i observes with positive probability under π.
Given a communication strategy π ∈ Π, a signal s ∈ Sπ generates the posterior belief
vector λs ∈ ∆(Ω)n defined by
λsi (ω) =
πi(si|ω)λ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω πi(si|ω′)λ0(ω′)
, i ∈ N, ω ∈ Ω. (1)
So, λsi (ω) is i’s posterior belief that the true state is ω upon receiving message si.
A communication strategy π ∈ Π induces the distribution σ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)n) over poste-
rior belief vectors if for all λ ∈ ∆(Ω)n it holds that
σ (λ) =
∑
s∈Sπ :λs=λ
∑
ω∈Ω
π(s|ω)λ0(ω). (2)
In words, σ(λ) is the probability of posterior belief vector λ. The distribution over pos-
terior belief vectors induced by π is denoted by σπ. We define the set of inducible distri-
butions over posterior belief vectors by
Σ = {σ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)n)| ∃π ∈ Π such that σπ = σ} .
Observe that Σ depends on the set S of signals that the sender can use: a distribution σ
might only be inducible if S is sufficiently rich. We will provide necessary and sufficient
conditions on S whenever appropriate.
Let σ ∈ ∆ (∆ (Ω)n) and denote the support of σ by R (σ) . By our assumptions made
so far, the support of σ is a finite set. For each i ∈ N and λi ∈ ∆(Ω), define
σi (λi) =
∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
σ(λ′). (3)
That is, σi (λi) is the probability that receiver i has posterior belief λi. We denote the
support of σi by R(σi).
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Let σ, σ′ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)n) be two distributions over posterior belief vectors and let α ∈
[0, 1]. The convex combination σ̂ = ασ + (1− α)σ′ is defined by
σ̂(λ) = ασ(λ) + (1− α)σ′(λ), λ ∈ ∆ (Ω)n .
Even in the case with a single receiver, Σ need not be convex. For instance, if S consists of
two messages, then it is possible to induce σ, σ′ ∈ Σ with disjoint supports of cardinality
2. If σ̂ is a strictly convex combination of σ and σ′, then the cardinality of the support of
σ̂ equals 4, which cannot be induced with two messages only. The next result shows that
Σ is convex when the signal space is sufficiently rich.
Proposition 2.1. Let σ, σ′ ∈ Σ and α ∈ (0, 1). Then ασ + (1 − α)σ′ ∈ Σ if and only if
|Si| ≥ |R (σi) ∪R (σ′i)| for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Let σ̂ = ασ + (1− α)σ′.
If there is i ∈ N such that |Si| < |R (σi) ∪R (σ′i)| then there are not sufficient messages
to implement all of i’s possible beliefs in R (σ̂i).
For the other direction, let |Si| ≥ |R (σi) ∪R (σ′i)| for all i ∈ N . Let π, π′ ∈ Π be such
that σπ = σ and σπ
′
= σ′. Since |Si| ≥ |R (σi) ∪R (σ′i)|, we can assume without loss of
generality that there is s ∈ S with si ∈ Sπi ∩ Sπ
′
i if and only if there are λ ∈ R (σ) and
λ′ ∈ R (σ′) such that λi = λ′i = λsi .
Let π̂ = απ+ (1−α)π′. Let s ∈ Sπ̂ and i ∈ N . Without loss of generality let si ∈ Sπi .
Assume first that si /∈ Sπ
′
i . It holds that, for every ω ∈ Ω,
λ̂si (ω) =
π̂i(si|ω)λ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω π̂i(si|ω′)λ0(ω′)
=
απi(si|ω)λ0(ω)
α
∑
ω′∈Ω πi(si|ω′)λ0(ω′)
= λsi (ω).
Assume next that si ∈ Sπ
′
i and observe that in this case
πi(si|ω)λ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω πi(si|ω′)λ0(ω′)
=
π′i(si|ω)λ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω π
′
i(si|ω′)λ0(ω′)
.
Thus,
λ̂si (ω) =
απi(si|ω)λ0(ω) + (1− α) π′i(si|ω)λ0(ω)
α
∑
ω′∈Ω πi(si|ω′)λ0(ω′) + (1− α)
∑
ω′∈Ω π
′
i(si|ω′)λ0(ω′)
= λsi (ω).
We have shown that R (σ̂) = R (σ) ∪R (σ′). We now have, for every λ ∈ ∆ (Ω)n ,
σ̂(λ) =
∑
s∈Sπ̂ :λ̂s=λ
∑
ω∈Ω
π̂(s|ω)λ0(ω)
= α
∑
s∈Sπ :λs=λ
∑
ω∈Ω
π(s|ω)λ0(ω) + (1− α)
∑
s∈Sπ′ :λ′s=λ
∑
ω∈Ω
π′(s|ω)λ0(ω)
= ασ(λ) + (1− α)σ′(λ).
Hence, π̂ induces σ̂.
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Most of the literature considers Si an arbitrary set that contains all messages that are
necessary. The previous proposition implies that in this case the set of inducible posteriors
is convex.
A distribution over posterior belief vectors σ ∈ ∆ (∆ (Ω)n) is Bayes plausible if∑
λi∈R(σi)
λi(ω)σi (λi) = λ
0(ω), i ∈ N, ω ∈ Ω. (4)
That is, for each receiver the expected posterior belief equals his prior belief. Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011) show that Σ is the set of Bayes plausible posterior distributions in
the single receiver case. It now follows for the multiple receiver case that every σ ∈ Σ
satisfies Bayes plausibility. We therefore obtain the following result, which is stated for
later reference and without proof.
Proposition 2.2. Every σ ∈ Σ is Bayes plausible.
3 Implementing Belief Vectors
When a sender is interacting with a single receiver who has no private information, Bayes
plausibility of a distribution σ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)n) is necessary and sufficient for σ to belong to
Σ. In particular, for any λ ∈ ∆(Ω) there is σ ∈ Σ such that σ(λ) > 0. In contrast, in the
multiple receiver case it is not true that any single posterior belief vector λ ∈ ∆(Ω)n can
occur with positive probability for a suitably chosen communication strategy. Our first
proposition shows that λ ∈ ∆(Ω)n can belong to the support of some σ ∈ Σ if and only
if there is at least one state which, according to λ, is deemed possible by all receivers.
Proposition 3.1. For every i ∈ N, let Si contain at least two messages. Let λ ∈ ∆(Ω)n.
There exists σ ∈ Σ with σ(λ) > 0 if and only if there is ω ∈ Ω such that
∏
i∈N λi(ω) > 0.
Proof. Assume π ∈ Π is such that σπ = σ with σ(λ) > 0. Suppose that
∏
i∈N λi(ω) = 0
for all ω ∈ Ω, that is, for all ω ∈ Ω there exists iω ∈ N such that λiω(ω) = 0. Let s ∈ Sπ
be such that λs = λ. Then it holds that, for all ω ∈ Ω, π(s|ω) ≤ πiω(siω |ω) = 0. We find
by (2) that σ(λ) = 0, leading to a contradiction. Consequently, there exists ω ∈ Ω such
that
∏
i∈N λi(ω) > 0.
For the converse, assume there exists ω ∈ Ω such that
∏
i∈N λi(ω) > 0. Let i ∈ N and
βi = maxω∈Ω(λi(ω)/λ
0(ω)) be the highest ratio across states of posterior belief to prior
belief for receiver i. Let xi, yi ∈ Si be two distinct messages. We define, for every ω ∈ Ω,
ρi(xi|ω) =
1
βi
λi(ω)
λ0(ω)
,
ρi(yi|ω) = 1− ρi(xi|ω),
ρi(si|ω) = 0, si ∈ Si \ {xi, yi}.
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Notice that ρi(xi|ω) ≤ 1. We obtain π : Ω→ ∆ (S) by defining, for every ω ∈ Ω,
π(s|ω) =
∏
i∈N
ρi(si|ω), s ∈ S.
It holds that π is a communication strategy with πi(si|ω) = ρi(si|ω) for every receiver
i ∈ N.
Let i ∈ N. For every s ∈ Sπ with si = xi it holds that
λsi (ω) =
πi(xi|ω)λ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω πi(xi|ω′)λ0(ω′)
=
1
βi
λi(ω)
λ0(ω)
λ0(ω)
1
βi
∑
ω′∈Ω
λi(ω′)
λ0(ω′)
λ0(ω′)
=
λi(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω λi(ω
′)
= λi(ω), ω ∈ Ω.
We have that λx̄ = λ, where x̄ = (x1, . . . , xn).
Let ω ∈ Ω be such that λi(ω) > 0. Then
σ (λ) ≥ π (x̄|ω)λ0 (ω) = λ0 (ω)
∏
i∈N
ρi(si|ω) > 0,
which implies that λ ∈ R(σπ).
Let there be two receivers and a binary state space, say Ω = {X, Y } , as in our example
in the introduction. It follows from Proposition 3.1 that a posterior belief vector λ with
λ(X) = (0, 1) cannot result with positive probability under any communication protocol
since λ1(X)λ2(X) = 0 and λ1(Y )λ2(Y ) = 0. At the same time, for each ε > 0, the
posterior belief vector λ with λ (X) = (ε, 1) can be obtained with positive probability.
We now generalize Proposition 3.1 from a single posterior belief vector to finite sets
of posterior belief vectors.
Proposition 3.2. Let R ⊆ ∆ (Ω)n be finite. For every i ∈ N, let Si contain at least
|Ri| + 1 messages, where Ri = {λi ∈ ∆(Ω) | λ ∈ R}. There exists σ ∈ Σ with R ⊆ R (σ)
if and only if for each λ ∈ R there exists ω ∈ Ω such that
∏
i∈N λi(ω) > 0.
Proof. Proposition 3.1 implies necessity. For the other direction, let Ri = {λ1i , . . . , λ
mi
i },
let {x1i , . . . , x
mi
i , yi} ⊆ Si be such that xki 6= x`i , yi for all k 6= ` and all i ∈ N . Let
R = {λ1, . . . , λm} and define π1, . . . , πm as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, where, for all
i ∈ N and all k = 1, . . . ,m one has λk ∈ R(σπk) and Sπki ⊆
{
xki , yi
}
. Let α1, . . . , αm > 0
with
∑m
k=1 α
k = 1, and let σ =
∑m
k=1 α
kσπ
k
. Since |Si| ≥ mi + 1 = |
⋃m
k=1R
(
σπ
k
i
)
|,
iterative application of Proposition 2.1 implies that σ ∈ Σ. Moreover, by construction,
σπ
(
λk
)
= αkσπ
k (
λk
)
> 0.
At this point we have identified sets that can be subsets of the support of an inducible
distribution over posterior belief vectors. In Section 6 we characterize all inducible dis-
tributions over posterior belief vectors and the sets that can be the support of such
distributions.
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4 Minimal and Direct Communication Strategies
A large part of the literature is interested in “straightforward” communication strategies
(Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) that send recommendations to receivers about what
action to take. In the present paper, we do not specify sets of feasible actions for receivers,
so that sending recommendations has no meaning. Nevertheless, some communication
strategies are easier to handle than others and this and the next section will introduce
some important classes.
Given a communication strategy π ∈ Π and s, s′ ∈ Sπ with s 6= s′, it is possible that
λs = λs
′
. That is, two distinct signals can generate the same posterior belief vector. This
motivates the following definition.
Definition 4.1. A communication strategy π ∈ Π is minimal if |Sπ| = |R(σπ)|. The set
of minimal communication strategies is denoted by Πm
Under a minimal communication strategy, different signals lead to different posterior belief
vectors. We give an illustration of a minimal communication strategy in the following
example.
Example 4.2. Let N = {1, 2}, Ω = {X, Y }, S1 = {v, w}, and S2 = {w, x, y}. Assume
that agents have a common prior λ0(X) = 1/2. Let π be given as follows:
π (v, x) (v, y) (w,w)
X 1
2
0 1
2
Y 0 1
2
1
2
.
We have Sπ = {(v, x), (v, y), (w,w)}. Irrespective of the signal received, receiver 1 gath-
ers no information about the state: he has posterior beliefs λ
(v,x)
1 (X) = λ
(v,y)
1 (X) =
λ
(w,w)
1 (X) = 1/2. For receiver 2, we have λ
(v,x)
2 (X) = 1, λ
(v,y)
2 (X) = 0, and λ
(w,w)
2 (X) =
1/2. It follows that
R(σπ) = {((1/2, 1/2), (1, 0)) , ((1/2, 1/2), (0, 1)) , ((1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2))} .
Since |Sπ| = |R(σπ)|, π is minimal. 4
In case of a single receiver, it is sufficient to have a bijection between Sπ and R(σ) to ensure
that each message leads to a different posterior, that is, to ensure that the communication
strategy employs a minimal number of messages. If there are multiple receivers, however,
the existence of such a bijection does not guarantee that the number of messages for each
receiver is in fact minimal. For instance, the two messages v, w in Example 4.1 both lead
to the posterior belief λ1(X) = 1/2 for receiver 1.
Definition 4.3. A communication strategy π ∈ Π is direct if for all i ∈ N it holds that
|Sπi | = |R(σπi )|. The set of direct communication strategies is denoted by Πd.
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In other words, under a direct communication strategy any two different messages must
lead to two different posterior beliefs. Hence, the number of different posterior beliefs a
receiver can have equals the cardinality of Sπi .
Example 4.4. Recall the minimal communication strategy π in Example 4.2. Receiver 1
has the same posterior belief after observing v and observing w, i.e., λ
(v,x)
1 (X) = λ
(w,w)
1 (X).
Thus, π is not direct. Consider the communication strategy π′ defined by:
π′ (w, x) (w, y) (w,w)
X 1
2
0 1
2
Y 0 1
2
1
2
.
We have Sπ
′
= {(w, x), (w, y), (w,w)} and accordingly we can write the support of σπ′ as
R(σπ
′
) = {((1/2, 1/2), (1, 0)) , ((1/2, 1/2), (0, 1)) , ((1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2))} .
Note that R(σπ) = R(σπ
′
). Since for all s, t ∈ Sπ′ and each i ∈ N we have λ′si = λ′ti if and
only if si = ti, π
′ is direct. 4
For any communication strategy π ∈ Π, |Sπi | = |R(σπi )| guarantees that a minimal number
of messages is employed and implies that the number of employed signals is minimal as
well. Thus, the following lemma does not come as a surprise.
Lemma 4.5. It holds that Πd ⊆ Πm.
Proof. Let π ∈ Πd. For each i ∈ N there exists a bijection φi : Sπi → R (σπi ) since π
is direct. In particular, for every s ∈ Sπ, we have λs = (φi (si))i∈N so that there is a
bijection between Sπ and R (σπ). Hence, |Sπ| = |R(σπ)|, that is, π is minimal.
We close this section by showing that any distribution in Σ can be induced by a direct
communication strategy. We do not provide a proof of Theorem 4.6 here, as it will follow
easily from later results. The proof can be found after Corollary 6.3.
Theorem 4.6. If σ ∈ Σ, then there exists π ∈ Πd such that σπ = σ.
5 Language Independent Communication Strategies
The same distribution over posterior belief vectors can be induced by various communica-
tion strategies with potentially disjoint signal spaces. We now proceed to show that there
is a canonical way to describe communication strategies. The principal idea is that the
sender sends to each receiver the belief that he should have after observing the message.
Definition 5.1. A communication strategy π ∈ Π is a language independent communi-
cation strategy (LICS) if Sπ ⊆ ∆(Ω)n and, for all s ∈ Sπ, λs = s. The set of language
independent communication strategies is denoted by Π`.
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Example 5.2. Let N = {1, 2}, Ω = {X, Y }, and λ0(X) = 1/3. The communication
strategy π ∈ Π is defined as follows:
π (x, x) (x, y) (y, x) (y, y)
X 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
Y 1
8
1
8
1
8
5
8
.
For any i ∈ N , we have λ(x,x)i (X) = 1/2 and λ
(y,y)
i (X) = 1/4. Hence, π is in fact direct.
The support of σπ is equal to
R(σπ) =
{
λ(x,x), λ(x,y), λ(y,x), λ(y,y)
}
=
{
((1
2
, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1
2
))((1
2
, 1
2
), (1
4
, 3
4
)), ((1
4
, 3
4
), (1
2
, 1
2
)), ((1
4
, 3
4
), (1
4
, 3
4
))
}
.
It holds that σπ
(
λ(x,x)
)
= σπ
(
λ(x,y)
)
= σπ
(
λ(y,x)
)
= 1/6 and σπ
(
λ(y,y)
)
= 1/2.
The communication strategy π′ ∈ Π is obtained by switching messages x and y, so
π′ (x, x) (x, y) (y, x) (y, y)
X 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
Y 5
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
.
It is immediate that σπ = σπ
′
.
Next, consider the communication strategy π̂ that corresponds to the convex combi-
nation of π and π′ with equal weights: π̂ = 1/2π + 1/2π′. We have that
π̂ (x, x) (x, y) (y, x) (y, y)
X 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
Y 3
8
1
8
1
8
3
8
.
Perhaps surprisingly, it holds that σπ̂ 6= σπ = σπ′ . It is easily verified that σπ̂ is the
distribution that assigns probability 1 to the posterior belief vector (λ0, λ0). It follows
that the set of communication strategies which induce a particular distribution is not
convex. Observe that π̂ is not direct, which implies that Πd is also not convex.
The communication strategies π`, π′`, and π̂` are obtained by relabeling the signals
sent by π, π′, and π̂, respectively, with the posterior belief vectors they lead to. We have
that π` = π′`. Both are equal to
π`, π′`
(
(1
2
, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1
2
)
) (
(1
2
, 1
2
), (1
4
, 3
4
)
) (
(1
4
, 3
4
), (1
2
, 1
2
)
) (
(1
4
, 3
4
), (1
4
, 3
4
)
)
X 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
Y 1
8
1
8
1
8
5
8
.
Each receiver has posterior belief (1/2, 1/2) upon observing message (1/2, 1/2) and has
posterior belief (1/4, 3/4) upon observing message (1/4, 3/4). Thus, π` and π′` are lan-
guage independent communication strategies.
Finally, π̂` sends λ0 to both players with probability 1. 4
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The next result states that an LICS is direct.
Lemma 5.3. It holds that Π` ⊆ Πd.
Proof. Let π ∈ Π`, s ∈ Sπ, and i ∈ N. It holds that λsi = si by definition of an LICS.
This defines an identity between Sπi and R(σ
π
i ). It follows that |Sπi | = |R(σπi )|.
By Lemma 5.3 we know that an LICS is direct and by Lemma 4.5 directness implies
minimality. Thus, there is a chain of inclusions between Π`, Πd, and Πm.
Corollary 5.4. It holds that Π` ⊆ Πd ⊆ Πm ⊆ Π.
Since we can transform any given direct communication strategy into an LICS by rela-
beling each message with the posterior belief that message leads to, an immediate conse-
quence of Theorem 4.6 is that any element of Σ can be induced by an LICS if ∆(Ω)n ⊆ S,
a result also obtained by Arieli et al. (2020) for a binary state space. One advantage of
language independent communication strategies is that for each σ ∈ Σ the set of all lan-
guage independent communication strategies that induce σ, denoted by Π`(σ), is convex.
The proof of this statement, however, is postponed as it follows easily from later results.
The proof can be found after Corollary 6.3.
Proposition 5.5. Let ∆(Ω)n ⊆ S and σ ∈ Σ. Then Π`(σ) is non-empty and convex.
It follows from Example 5.2 that both the set of all communication strategies and the set
of all direct communication strategies that induce a given σ is typically not convex.
Recall that given a direct communication strategy, we can obtain an LICS by simply
replacing messages with the posterior beliefs they lead to. More generally, given a com-
munication strategy π ∈ Π, one can define π′ ∈ Π by a one-to-one change in the names
of messages in Sπi for each i ∈ N . In this case, we typically have Sπ
′ 6= Sπ, though we
intuitively think of both communication strategies as equivalent. More formally, we have
the following definition.
Definition 5.6. Two communication strategies π : Ω → ∆(S) and π̂ : Ω → ∆(Ŝ) are
equivalent (π ∼ π̂) if for every i ∈ N there is a bijection ψi : Sπi → Ŝπ̂i such that, for every
ω ∈ Ω, for every s ∈ Sπ, π̂ (ψ(s)|ω) = π(s|ω).
We can interpret equivalent communication strategies as providing the same information
in different languages. Indeed, let si ∈ Sπi and ŝi ∈ Ŝπ̂i be such that ψi(si) = ŝi. It holds
that
πi(si|ω) =
∑
t∈Sπ :ti=si
π(t|ω) =
∑
t∈Sπ :ti=si
π̂ (ψ(t)|ω) =
∑
t̂∈Ŝπ̂ :t̂i=ŝi
π̂(t̂|ω) = π̂i(ŝi|ω), ω ∈ Ω.
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Now consider s ∈ Sπ and ŝ ∈ Ŝπ̂ such that ŝ = ψ(s). For every i ∈ N, we have that
λsi (ω) =
πi(si|ω)λ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω πi(si|ω′)λ0(ω′)
=
π̂i(ŝi|ω)λ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω π̂i(ŝi|ω′)λ0(ω′)
= λ̂ŝi (ω). (5)
It follows from (5) that sending signal s under communication strategy π and sending
signal ŝ under communication strategy π̂ results in the same posterior belief vector. It is
also immediate from Definition 5.6 that Ŝπ̂ = ψ(Sπ).
The next proposition, stating that equivalent communication strategies induce the
same distribution over posterior belief vectors, now follows easily.
Proposition 5.7. Let π : Ω→ ∆(S) and π̂ : Ω→ ∆(Ŝ) be such that π ∼ π̂. It holds that
σπ = σπ̂.
Proof. For every i ∈ N there is a bijection ψi : Sπi → Ŝπ̂i such that, for every ω ∈ Ω, for
every s ∈ Sπ, π̂ (ψ(s)|ω) = π(s|ω). Let s ∈ Sπ and ŝ ∈ Ŝπ̂ be such that ψ(s) = ŝ. It
follows from (5) that λs = λ̂ŝ. Since Ŝπ̂ = ψ(Sπ), we have that R(σπ̂) = R(σπ). Moreover,
it holds that, for every λ ∈ R(σπ),
σπ (λ) =
∑
s∈Sπ :λs=λ
∑
ω∈Ω
π(s|ω)λ0(ω) =
∑
s∈Sπ :λs=λ
∑
ω∈Ω
π̂ (ψ(s)|ω)λ0(ω)
=
∑
ŝ∈Ŝπ̂ :λ̂ŝ=λ
∑
ω∈Ω
π̂(ŝ|ω)λ0(ω) = σπ̂ (λ) .
Note that the converse of Proposition 5.7 is not true: as we will see in Example 6.6
there are communication strategies that induce the same distribution over posterior belief
vectors but that are not equivalent.
The next proposition and corollary makes clear that each set of equivalent communi-
cation strategies contains at most one LICS.
Proposition 5.8. Let π, π′ ∈ Π` with π ∼ π′. It holds that π = π′.
Proof. By Proposition 5.7 it holds that σπ = σπ
′
, so Sπ = R (σπ) = R
(
σπ
′)
= Sπ
′
. As
π ∼ π′, for every i ∈ N there is a bijection ψi : Sπi → Sπ
′
i such that, for every ω ∈ Ω,
for every s ∈ Sπ, π′ (ψ(s)|ω) = π(s|ω). In particular, since π, π′ ∈ Π`, we have, for every
i ∈ N, for every λ ∈ Sπ,
ψi (λi) (ω) =
π′i (ψi (λi) |ω)λ0 (ω)∑
ω′∈Ω π
′
i (ψi (λi) |ω′)λ0 (ω′)
=
πi (λi|ω)λ0 (ω)∑
ω′∈Ω πi (λi|ω′)λ0 (ω′)
= λi (ω) , ω ∈ Ω,
(6)
where the first and third equality follow since π, π′ ∈ Π` and the second equality uses (5).
It follows that π = π′.
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Observe that a communication strategy that is not direct cannot be equivalent to an LICS
as the required bijection between message spaces cannot exist. Nevertheless for every
communication strategy there is a canonical way to find an LICS that induces the same
posterior. The construction heavily lies on the following lemma, which is straightforward
and therefore stated without proof.3
Lemma 5.9. Let π ∈ Π be a communication strategy. It holds that∑
si∈Sπi :λsi=λi
πi (si|ω)λ0 (ω)∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
si∈Sπi :λsi=λi
πi (si|ω′)λ0 (ω′)
= λi (ω) , ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N, λi ∈ R (σπi ) .
Lemma 5.9 extends the formula for Bayesian updating and applies it to all messages
simultaneously that lead a particular posterior belief. According to the lemma, distinct
messages that lead to the same posterior can be replaced by the same message. Thus, the
following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 5.10. Let ∆(Ω)n ⊆ S. For π ∈ Π define π` : Ω→ ∆(S) as
π` (λ|ω) =
∑
s∈Sπ :λs=λ
π (s|ω) , ω ∈ Ω, λ ∈ R (σπ) . (7)
Then σπ
`
= σπ. Moreover, if π ∈ Πd then π` is equivalent to π.
6 Inducible Distributions
Unlike the single receiver case, when dealing with multiple receivers Bayes plausibility
alone is not sufficient to ensure that a distribution over posterior belief vectors belongs
to Σ.
Example 6.1. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, Ω = {X, Y }, and S = ∆(Ω)3. Assume the agents
have common prior λ0(X) = 1/6. Let λ1(X) = (1/2, 1/2, 0), λ2(X) = (1/2, 0, 1/2),
λ3(X) = (0, 1/2, 1/2), and λ4(X) = (0, 0, 0) and let σ ∈ ∆
(
∆ (Ω)3
)
be given by σ (λ1) =
σ (λ2) = σ (λ3) = 1/6 and σ (λ4) = 1/2. Then, for each i ∈ N, we have σi (1/2, 1/2) = 1/3
and σi(0, 1) = 2/3.
First note that σ is Bayes plausible:∑
λi∈R(σi)
λi(X)σi (λi) =
1
2
· σi(1/2, 1/2) + 0 · σi(0, 1) =
1
2
· 1
3
=
1
6
= λ0(X), i ∈ N.
Suppose that communication strategy π ∈ Π induces σ. By Corollary 5.10 it is without
loss of generality to assume that π ∈ Π`. In this case, for any receiver, observing (1/2, 1/2)
3It is implied by the proof of Lemma 3.4 in Kerman et al. (2020).
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leads to posterior belief (1/2, 1/2) and observing (0, 1) leads to posterior belief (0, 1). This
implies that receivers cannot observe (0, 1) in state X, i.e., πi((0, 1)|X) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
It follows that π (λ1|X) = π (λ2|X) = π (λ3|X) = π (λ4|X) = 0, which obviously leads to
a contradiction. 4
To guarantee that a distribution over posterior belief vectors belongs to Σ, additional
conditions need to be imposed on top of Bayes plausibility. In Theorem 6.2, we provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for a distribution over posterior belief vectors to belong
to Σ.
Theorem 6.2. Let σ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)n) be such that, for every i ∈ N, |Si| ≥ |R(σi)|. Then
σ ∈ Σ if and only if σ is Bayes plausible and there exists p ∈ RΩ×R(σ)+ such that
(i)
∑
ω∈Ω p(ω, λ) = σ (λ) , λ ∈ R(σ),
(ii)
∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
p(ω, λ′) = λi(ω)σi (λi) , ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N, λi ∈ R(σi).
If σ ∈ Σ, then the communication strategy π : Ω→ ∆(∆(Ω)n) defined by
π (λ|ω) = p(ω, λ)
λ0(ω)
, ω ∈ Ω, λ ∈ R(σ), (8)
is an LICS such that σπ = σ.
Proof. Assume that σ is Bayes plausible and there exists p ∈ RΩ×R(σ)+ such that (i) and
(ii) are satisfied. Let π be defined as in (8). We first show that π is a communication
strategy.
Let ω ∈ Ω. Obviously, it holds that, for every λ ∈ ∆(Ω)n, π(λ|ω) ≥ 0. In formula (9)
that follows next, i ∈ N is an arbitrarily chosen receiver. It holds that∑
λ∈Sπ
p (ω, λ) =
∑
λi∈Ri(σi)
∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
p(ω, λ′)
(ii)
=
∑
λi∈Ri(σi)
λi(ω)σi (λi) = λ
0(ω), (9)
where the last equality is true as σ is Bayes plausible. We find that∑
λ∈Sπ
π(λ|ω) =
∑
λ∈Sπ
p (ω, λ)
λ0(ω)
(9)
=
λ0(ω)
λ0(ω)
= 1,
which proves that π is a communication strategy.
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Next, we show that π is an LICS. Let ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N, and λi ∈ R(σi). It holds that
πi(λi|ω)λ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω πi(λi|ω′)λ0(ω′)
=
∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
π(λ′|ω)λ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
π(λ′|ω′)λ0(ω′)
(8)
=
∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
p(ω,λ′)
λ0(ω)
λ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
p(ω′,λ′)
λ0(ω′)
λ0(ω′)
=
∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
p (ω, λ′)∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
p (ω′, λ′)
(ii)
=
λi(ω)σi (λi)∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
∑
ω′∈Ω p (ω
′, λ′)
(i)
=
λi(ω)σi (λi)∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
σ (λ′)
=
λi(ω)σi (λi)
σi (λi)
= λi(ω).
As message λi leads to posterior λi, π is an LICS.
We show next that σπ = σ. Let λ ∈ R(σ). It holds that
σπ(λ) =
∑
ω∈Ω
π(λ|ω)λ0(ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω, λ)
λ0(ω)
λ0(ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω, λ)
(i)
= σ(λ).
At this point we have shown that σ is inducible if R (σi) ⊆ Si. Recall that |Si| ≥ R (σi).
For every i ∈ N, let Ti be a subset of Si with cardinality equal to |R(σi)| and take a
bijection ψi : R(σi)→ Ti. The communication strategy π′ : Ω→ ∆(S) is defined by
π′(ψ(λ)|ω) = π(λ|ω), ω ∈ Ω, λ ∈ R(σ).
It holds that π ∼ π′, so by Proposition 5.7 we have that σπ′ = σπ = σ. It follows that
σ ∈ Σ.
Now assume that σ ∈ Σ. It follows from Proposition 2.2 that σ is Bayes plausible. Let
π ∈ Π be such that σπ = σ. For every ω ∈ Ω, for every λ ∈ R (σ), define
p (ω, λ) =
∑
s∈Sπ :λs=λ
π(s|ω)λ0(ω). (10)
We first show that (i) holds. We have that
σ (λ) =
∑
s∈Sπ :λs=λ
∑
ω∈Ω
π(s|ω)λ0(ω) (10)=
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω, λ) , λ ∈ R(σ).
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Next, we show (ii) holds. Let ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N, and λi ∈ R (σi) . We have that
λi(ω)σi (λi) =
∑
si∈Sπi :λsi=λi
πi(si|ω)λ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
si∈Sπi :λsi=λi
πi(si|ω′)λ0(ω′)
∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
σ (λ′)
=
∑
si∈Sπi :λsi=λi
πi(si|ω)λ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
si∈Sπi :λsi=λi
πi(si|ω′)λ0(ω′)
∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
∑
s∈Sπ :λs=λ′
∑
ω′∈Ω
π (s|ω′)λ0 (ω′)
=
∑
si∈Sπi :λsi=λi
πi(si|ω)λ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
si∈Sπi :λsi=λi
πi(si|ω′)λ0(ω′)
∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
si∈Sπi :λsi=λi
πi (si|ω′)λ0 (ω′)
=
∑
si∈Sπi :λsi=λi
πi(si|ω)λ0(ω)
=
∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
∑
s∈Sπ :λs=λ′
π (s|ω)λ0 (ω)
=
∑
λ′∈R(σ):λ′i=λi
p (ω, λ′) ,
where the first equality follows from Lemma 5.9.
Theorem 6.2 makes explicit what is needed in addition to Bayes plausibility to ensure that
a distribution over posterior belief vectors belongs to Σ. Observe that any p ∈ RΩ×R(σ)+
which satisfies Condition (i) is a probability distribution, that is, p ∈ ∆ (Ω×R (σ)).
Condition (i) can be interpreted as “posterior marginality” as it states that the probability
of a posterior belief vector λ is the marginal of p(ω, λ). The right-hand side of condition
(ii) is the probability that ω is the true state according to i’s belief λi multiplied with the
probability that i has belief λi. Thus, the sum on the left-hand side is the probability
that i has belief λi and ω is the true state.
For any σ ∈ Σ define
P (σ) =
{
p ∈ RΩ×R(σ)+ | p satisfies (i) and (ii) of Theorem 6.2
}
.
As P (σ) is defined as the set of non-negative matrix solutions to a system of linear
equalities, where the system is such that the components of any solution matrix sum up
to one, we immediately have the following result.
Corollary 6.3. For every σ ∈ Σ, P (σ) is a non-empty, compact, and convex polytope.
We are now ready to provide the remaining proofs of Sections 5 and 6.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. Let σ ∈ Σ. Then it holds that, for every i ∈ N, |Si| ≥ R(σi).
Theorem 6.2 implies that there is an LICS π : Ω→ ∆(∆(Ω)n) which induces σ. For every
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i ∈ N, let Ti be a subset of Si with cardinality equal to |R(σi)| and take a bijection
ψi : R(σi)→ Ti. The communication strategy π′ : Ω→ ∆(S) is defined by
π′(ψ(λ)|ω) = π(λ|ω), ω ∈ Ω, λ ∈ R(σ).
It holds that π ∼ π′, so by Proposition 5.7 we have that σπ′ = σπ = σ. As the LICS π is
direct, it follows that π′ ∈ Πd.
Proof of Proposition 5.5. As P (σ) is a non-empty, compact, and convex polytope by
Corollary 6.3 and Π` (σ) is a linear transformation of P (σ) by (8), Π` (σ) is a non-empty,
compact, and convex polytope as well.
In the next example, we make use of Theorem 6.2 to determine whether a given distribu-
tion over posterior belief vectors belongs to Σ.
Example 6.4. Recall the distribution over posterior belief vectors σ in Example 6.1 with
R(σ) =
{
λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4
}
=
{(
(1
2
, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1
2
), (0, 1)
)
,
(
(1
2
, 1
2
), (0, 1), (1
2
, 1
2
)
)
,
(
(0, 1), (1
2
, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1
2
)
)
, ((0, 1), (0, 1), (0, 1))
}
.
Moreover, we have σ(λ1) = σ(λ2) = σ(λ3) = 1/6 and σ(λ4) = 1/2.
Suppose σ ∈ Σ. Then, by Theorem 6.2 there exists p ∈ P (σ) such that
p
(
X,λ1
)
+ p
(
X,λ2
)
= p
(
X,λ1
)
+ p
(
X,λ3
)
= p
(
X,λ2
)
+ p
(
X,λ3
)
=
1
6
p
(
X,λ1
)
+ p
(
X,λ4
)
= p
(
X,λ2
)
+ p
(
X,λ4
)
= p
(
X,λ3
)
+ p
(
X,λ4
)
= 0,
where we make use of Condition (ii) for ω = X. From the first line we obtain p (X,λ1) =
p (X,λ2) = p (X,λ3) = 1/12. Combining this with the second, we find p (X,λ4) = −1/12.
Thus, p fails to be non-negative and σ /∈ Σ. 4
Proposition 3.2 gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a finite set R ⊆ ∆ (Ω)n to be
a subset of R(σ) for some σ ∈ Σ. We will now provide a necessary and sufficient condition
for such a set R to coincide with R(σ) for some σ ∈ Σ.
Proposition 6.5. Let the non-empty and finite R ⊆ ∆(Ω)n be such that, for every i ∈ N,
|Si| ≥ |Ri|. There exists σ ∈ Σ with R(σ) = R if and only if there is p ∈ RΩ×R+ such that
(i)
∑
λ∈R p(ω, λ) = λ
0(ω), ω ∈ Ω,
(ii)
∑
λ′∈R:λ′i=λi
p(ω, λ′) = λi(ω)
∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
λ′∈R:λ′i=λi
p(ω′, λ′), ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N, λi ∈ Ri.
If there is σ ∈ Σ with R(σ) = R, then the communication strategy π : Ω → ∆(∆(Ω)n)
defined by
π (λ|ω) = p(ω, λ)
λ0(ω)
, ω ∈ Ω, λ ∈ R(σ), (11)
is an LICS such that R(σπ) = R.
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Proof. Assume that (i) and (ii) hold. Let π : Ω → ∆(∆(Ω)n) be as defined in (11). We
have that ∑
λ′∈R
π(λ′|ω) (11)=
∑
λ′∈R
p(ω, λ′)
λ0(ω)
(i)
=
λ0(ω)
λ0(ω)
= 1, ω ∈ Ω.
Moreover, for every ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N, and λi ∈ Ri, it holds that∑
λ′∈R:λ′i=λi
π(λ′|ω)λ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
λ′∈R:λ′i=λi
π(λ′|ω′)λ0(ω′)
(11)
=
∑
λ′∈R:λ′i=λi
p(ω, λ′)∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
λ′∈R:λ′i=λi
p(ω′, λ′)
(ii)
=
λi(ω)
∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
λ′∈R:λ′i=λi
p(ω′, λ′)∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
λ′∈R:λ′i=λi
p(ω′, λ′)
= λi(ω).
Thus, π is an LICS such that R(σπ) = R.
Finally, for every i ∈ N, let Ti be a subset of Si with cardinality equal to |Ri| and take
a bijection ψi : Ri → Ti. The communication strategy π′ : Ω→ ∆(S) is defined by
π′(ψ(λ)|ω) = π(λ|ω), ω ∈ Ω, λ ∈ R.
It holds that π ∼ π′, so by Proposition 5.7 we have that σπ′ = σπ and R(σπ′) = R.
Now assume that σ ∈ Σ is such that R(σ) = R. Then, by Theorem 6.2, π : Ω →
∆(∆(Ω)n) defined as in (11) is an LICS that induces σ. Then (i) is satisfied since∑
λ′∈R
p(ω, λ′)
(11)
=
∑
λ′∈R
π(λ′|ω)λ0(ω) = λ0(ω)
∑
λ′∈Sπ
π(λ′|ω) = λ0(ω), ω ∈ Ω.
Further, for every ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ N, and λi ∈ Ri, it holds that∑
λ′∈R:λ′i=λi
p(ω, λ′)
(11)
=
∑
λ′∈R:λ′i=λi
π(λ′|ω)λ0(ω) = πi (λi|ω)λ0 (ω)
(1)
= λi(ω)
∑
ω′∈Ω
πi(λi|ω′)λ0(ω′) = λi(ω)
∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
λ′∈R:λ′i=λi
π(λ′|ω′)λ0(ω′)
(11)
= λi(ω)
∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
λ′∈R:λ′i=λi
p(ω′, λ′).
Hence, (ii) is satisfied.
As π is defined by (11), (i) ensures that π (·|ω) ∈ ∆(Ω)n for all ω ∈ Ω and π is, hence,
a communication strategy. Condition (ii) ensures correct belief updating: as before the
left-hand side is the probability that i has belief λi and the true state is ω; the right-hand
side is the product of the probability that the state is ω conditional on i’s having belief
λi and the probability that i has belief λi.
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In our discussion of Proposition 5.7, stating that equivalent communication strategies
induce the same distribution, we announced that the converse be not true. We can now
easily provide the required counterexample.
Example 6.6. Let N = {1, 2}, Ω = {X, Y }, λ0(X) = 1/3, and S = ∆(Ω)n. Consider the
distribution σ defined by
R(σπ) =
{
λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4
}
=
{
((1
2
, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1
2
))((1
2
, 1
2
), (1
4
, 3
4
)), ((1
4
, 3
4
), (1
2
, 1
2
)), ((1
4
, 3
4
), (1
4
, 3
4
))
}
,
σ(λ1) = σ(λ2) = σ(λ3) = 1/6 and σ(λ4) = 1/2. One can easily verify that p, p′ ∈ RΩ×R(σ)+
defined by
p(ω, λ) λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4
X 1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
Y 1
12
1
12
1
12
5
12
p′(ω, λ) λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4
X 1
6
0 0 1
6
Y 0 1
6
1
6
1
3
are both solutions to the system of equations in Theorem 6.2. We define π, π′ ∈ Π` by
applying (8) to p and p′, respectively, that is,
π(λ|ω) λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4
X 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
Y 1
8
1
8
1
8
5
8
π′(λ|ω) λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4
X 1
2
0 0 1
2
Y 0 1
4
1
4
1
2
Both π and π′ induce σ. Yet, as π 6= π′, Proposition 5.8 implies that π and π′ are not
equivalent. 4
7 The Information and Posterior Correspondences
Our objective in this section is to provide a framework in which we can analyze what
receivers know about each other’s messages, so that we can later answer the question of
how a sender can make sure that receivers know “as little as possible”.
Given a communication strategy π ∈ Π, we refer to an element (ω, s) ∈ Ω × Sπ such
that π(s|ω) > 0 as a history and to an element (ω, λ) ∈ Ω×R(σπ) such that there exists
s ∈ Sπ with π(s|ω) > 0 and λs = λ as a posterior history. We denote the sets of histories
and posterior histories, respectively, by
Hπ = {(ω, s) ∈ Ω× Sπ| π(s|ω) > 0} ,
Λπ = {(ω, λ) ∈ Ω×∆(Ω)n|∃s ∈ Sπ such that π(s|ω) > 0 and λs = λ} .
Note that if π ∈ Π`, then Hπ = Λπ.
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Example 7.1. Recall π and π′ from Example 6.6. The sets of possible histories are:
Hπ =
{(
X,λ1
)
,
(
X,λ2
)
,
(
X,λ3
)
,
(
X,λ4
)
,
(
Y, λ1
)
,
(
Y, λ2
)
,
(
Y, λ3
)
,
(
Y, λ4
)}
Hπ
′
=
{(
X,λ1
)
,
(
X,λ4
)
,
(
Y, λ2
)
,
(
Y, λ3
)
,
(
Y, λ4
)}
.
As both communication strategies are language independent, we have Λπ = Hπ and
Λπ
′
= Hπ
′
. 4
We next introduce the standard notion of an information correspondence.
Definition 7.2. Let π ∈ Π. The information correspondence P πi : Hπ ⇒ Hπ of i ∈ N is
defined as
P πi (ω, s) = {(ω′, s′) ∈ Hπ| s′i = si} , (ω, s) ∈ Hπ.
That is, P πi (ω, s) is the set of histories receiver i considers possible when the true history is
(ω, s). As we call P πi an information correspondence, it seems appropriate to briefly show
that this name is deserved, i.e., consistent with the common definition of an information
correspondence, see for instance Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
Lemma 7.3. Let π ∈ Π and i ∈ N. The information correspondence P πi satisfies the
following two conditions:
C1 For all (ω, s) ∈ Hπ, (ω, s) ∈ P πi (ω, s).
C2 If (ω′, s′) ∈ P πi (ω, s), then P πi (ω′, s′) = P πi (ω, s).
Proof. Let (ω, s) ∈ Hπ. Suppose (ω, s) /∈ P πi (ω, s). Then, si 6= si, a contradiction. Thus,
C1 is satisfied.
Next, let (ω′, s′) ∈ P πi (ω, s) and (ω′′, s′′) ∈ P πi (ω′, s′). Then, s′′i = s′i = si, so (ω′′, s′′) ∈
P πi (ω, s), and consequently, P
π
i (ω
′, s′) ⊆ P πi (ω, s). Since s′i = si, it holds that (ω, s) ∈
P πi (ω
′, s′) as well, and the same arguments imply P πi (ω, s) ⊆ P πi (ω′, s′). So, C2 is satisfied.
Information correspondences have the property that they partition sets of histories into
information sets. In our case we can use P πi to define a partition of the set H
π as
Pπi = {P πi (ω, s)| (ω, s) ∈ Hπ} .
This partition reflects i’s knowledge about the true history: whenever the true history is
(ω, s), i knows that the true history lies in P πi (ω, s).
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Example 7.4. Recall π in Example 4.2. The information correspondence partitions the
set of histories as follows:
P π1 (X, (v, x)) = P
π
1 (Y, (v, y)) = {(X, (v, x)), (Y, (v, y))} ,
P π1 (X, (w,w)) = P
π
1 (Y, (w,w)) = {(X, (w,w)), (Y, (w,w))} ,
P π2 (X, (v, x)) = {(X, (v, x)} ,
P π2 (Y, (v, y)) = {(Y, (v, y))} ,
P π2 (X, (w,w)) = P
π
2 (Y, (w,w)) = {(X, (w,w)), (Y, (w,w))} .
Now consider π′ in Example 4.4. The information correspondence partitions the set
of histories as follows:
P π
′
1 (X, (w, x)) = P
π′
1 (Y, (w, y)) = P
π′
1 (X, (w,w)) = P
π′
1 (Y, (w,w))
= {(X, (w, x)), (Y, (w, y)), (X, (w,w)), (Y, (w,w))} ,
P π
′
2 (X, (w, x)) = {(X, (w, x)} ,
P π
′
2 (Y, (w, y)) = {(Y, (w, y))} ,
P π
′
2 (X, (w,w)) = P
π′
2 (Y, (w,w)) = {(X, (w,w)), (Y, (w,w))} .
It is easy to verify that both C1 and C2 are satisfied. In particular, the information
partitions of Pπi and, respectively, Pπ
′
i are given by
Pπ1 = {{(X, (v, x)), (Y, (v, y))} , {(X, (w,w)), (Y, (w,w))}} ,
Pπ2 = {{(X, (v, x))} , {(Y, (v, y))} , {(X, (w,w)), (Y, (w,w))}} ,
Pπ′1 = {{(X, (w, x)), (Y, (w, y)), (X, (w,w)), (Y, (w,w))}} ,
Pπ′2 = {{(X, (w, x))} , {(Y, (w, y))} , {(X, (w,w)), (Y, (w,w))}} .
4
Even though π and π′ in Example 7.4 induce the same distribution, it is not possible to
compare their information partitions since they employ different messages and thus have
distinct sets of histories. Still, we can compare such communication strategies via the sets
of possible posterior histories of receivers.
Definition 7.5. Let π ∈ Π. The posterior correspondence Qπi : Hπ ⇒ Λπ of i ∈ N is
defined as
Qπi (ω, s) = {(ω′, λs
′
) ∈ Λπ| (ω′, s′) ∈ P πi (ω, s)}, (ω, s) ∈ Hπ.
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The set Qπi (ω, s) contains all posterior histories i deems possible if the true history is
(ω, s).
Example 7.6. Recall the information correspondences in Example 7.4. The posterior
correspondences related to π are as follows.
Qπ1 (X, (t, x)) =
{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 0
))}
,
Qπ1 (X, (w,w)) =
{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))}
,
Qπ2 (X, (t, x)) =
{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
))}
,
Qπ2 (Y, (t, y)) =
{(
Y,
(
1
2
, 0
))}
,
Qπ2 (X, (w,w)) =
{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))}
.
The posterior correspondences related to π′ are as follows.
Qπ
′
1 (X, (w, x)) =
{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 0
))
,
(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))}
,
Qπ
′
2 (X, (w, x)) =
{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
))}
,
Qπ
′
2 (Y, (w, y)) =
{(
Y,
(
1
2
, 0
))}
,
Qπ
′
2 (X, (w,w)) =
{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))}
.
One can easily see that there is a bijection between the set of possible histories and the
set of possible posterior histories for both π and π′. 4
For π ∈ Π and i ∈ N, define Qπi = {Qπi (ω, s)| (ω, s) ∈ Hπ}. Note that in Example 7.6
both Qπi and Qπ
′
i are partitions for any i ∈ N. However, this is not always true.
Example 7.7. Let N = {1, 2}, Ω = {X, Y }, and λ0(X) = 1/3. Let communication
strategy π ∈ Π be given as follows:
π (x, x) (x, y) (y, x) (y, y) (a, a) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b)
X 1
6
0 0 1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
Y 0 1
12
1
12
1
6
1
12
1
12
1
12
5
12
For the posterior correspondence we find
Qπ1 (X, (x, x)) =
{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 1
4
))}
,
Qπ1 (X, (a, a)) =
{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))
,
(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
4
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 1
4
))}
.
Since Qπ1 (X, (x, x)) 6= Qπ1 (X, (a, a)) and (X, (1/2, 1/2)) ∈ Qπ1 (X, (x, x)) ∩ Qπ1 (X, (a, a)),
Qπ1 is not a partition. 4
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The reason why Qπ1 in Example 7.7 is not a partition is that signals (x, x) and (a, a) lead to
the same posterior belief vector, yet (x, x) realizes only in state X whereas (a, a) realizes
in both states. This situation, of course, can happen only as long as the communication
strategy is not minimal. Put differently, π ∈ Πm is sufficient for Qπi to be a partition for
all i ∈ N .
For π ∈ Π, we define the function φ : Hπ → Λπ by
φ(ω, s) = (ω, λs), (ω, s) ∈ Hπ.
Proposition 7.8. Let π ∈ Πm. Then φ is a bijection and, for every (ω, s), (ω′, s′) ∈ Hπ
and every i ∈ N , it holds that (ω, s) ∈ P πi (ω′, s′) if and only if φ(ω, s) ∈ Qπi (ω′, s′). In
particular, Qπi is a partition.
Proof. First note that since π ∈ Πm, for any (ω, s), (ω′, s′) ∈ Hπ with s 6= s′, it holds that
(ω, λs) 6=
(
ω′, λs
′)
. That is, no two distinct histories are mapped to the same posterior
history. Thus, φ is a bijection.
Let (ω, s), (ω′, s′) ∈ Hπ and i ∈ N. If (ω, s) ∈ P πi (ω′, s′), then φ (ω, s) = (ω, λs) ∈
Qπi (ω
′, s′) by the definition of Qπi (ω
′, s′). If (ω, λs) = φ(ω, s) ∈ Qπi (ω′, s′), then (ω, s) ∈
P πi (ω
′, s′). Therefore, (ω, s) ∈ P πi (ω′, s′) if and only if φ(ω, s) ∈ Qπi (ω′, s′).
Suppose Qπi (ω, s) ∩ Qπi (ω′, s′) 6= ∅. It follows that P πi (ω, s) ∩ P πi (ω′, s′) 6= ∅, so
P πi (ω, s) = P
π
i (ω
′, s′). Therefore, Qπi (ω, s) = φ (P
π
i (ω, s)) = φ (P
π
i (ω
′, s′)) = Qπi (ω
′, s′) ,
so Qπi is a partition.
The converse of Proposition 7.8 is not true. That is, even if the map φ is a bijection with
the required properties, it is still possible that π is not minimal.
Example 7.9. Let N = {1, 2}, Ω = {X, Y }, and λ0(X) = 1/3. The communication
strategy π ∈ Π is defined by
π (a, a) (b, b) (a, c) (c, a) (b, d) (d, b) (e, e)
X 1
6
0 0 0 1
4
1
6
5
12
Y 0 1
4
1
6
1
4
0 0 1
3
Then, for receiver 1 we have λ
(a,a)
1 (X) = λ
(b,b)
1 (X) = 1/3, λ
(c,a)
1 (X) = 0, λ
(d,b)
1 (X) = 1,
and λ
(e,e)
1 (X) = 5/13. For receiver 2 we have λ
(a,a)
2 (X) = λ
(b,b)
2 (X) = 1/4, λ
(a,c)
2 (X) = 0,
λ
(b,d)
2 (X) = 1, and λ
(e,e)
2 (X) = 5/13. Note that signals (a, a) and (b, b) lead to the same
posterior belief vector, (1/3, 1/4). Thus, π is not minimal. For the support of the induced
distribution σ we find
R(σ) =
{(
1
3
, 1
4
)
,
(
1
3
, 0
)
,
(
0, 1
4
)
,
(
1
3
, 1
)
,
(
1, 1
4
)
,
(
5
13
, 5
13
)}
.
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π Pπi
π` Pπ`i = Qπi = Qπ
`
i
Figure 1: Commuting Diagram for π ∈ Πd, see Corollary 7.10.
The sets Pπ1 and Qπ1 defined by the information and posterior correspondence of receiver 1
are as follows:
Pπ1 = {{(X, (a, a)), (Y, (a, c))} , {(Y, (c, a))} , {(X, (b, d)), (Y, (b, b))} , {(X, (d, b))} ,
{(X, (e, e)), (Y, (e, e))}} ,
Qπ1 =
{{(
X,
(
1
3
, 1
4
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
3
, 0
))}
,
{(
Y,
(
0, 1
4
))}
,
{(
X,
(
1
3
, 1
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
3
, 1
4
))}
,
{(
X,
(
1, 1
4
))}
,{(
X,
(
5
13
, 5
13
))
,
(
Y,
(
5
13
, 5
13
))}}
.
Similar calculations can be made for receiver 2. It is easily checked that not only are Qπ1
and Qπ2 partitions, but φ is a bijection as well. The reason Qπ1 and Qπ2 are partitions,
even though π /∈ Πm, is that the signals which lead to the same posterior, (a, a) and (b, b),
never realize in the same state. 4
Observe that if π ∈ Π`, then φ is the identity. Hence, the proposition implies that the
partitions Pπi and Qπi are identical. For all π ∈ Πd, let π` ∈ Π` be defined as in (7), i.e.,
π` denotes the LICS obtained by replacing the messages of π by the posteriors they lead
to. Then the posterior history partition of π is equal to the history partition of π`. Thus,
we have the following corollary which is depicted in the diagram in Figure 1.
Corollary 7.10. Let π ∈ Πd and π` ∈ Π` be defined as in (7). Then, for all i ∈ N ,
Qπi = Qπ
`
i = Pπ
`
i .
8 Informativeness of Communication Strategies
Example 7.6 derives the posterior correspondences of the receivers under π and π′ from
Examples 4.2 and 4.4. Observe that receiver 1 has more precise information about re-
ceiver 2’s knowledge of the true state under π: while he only observes w under π′ and,
thus, never learns what message receiver 2 has observed, under π upon observing v he
knows that receiver 2 knows the true state. In this sense π is “more informative”: a
notion that depends on the posterior correspondence and which we will make more for-
mal soon. Beforehand, we make the brief observation that the posterior correspondence
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itself is invariant under equivalence or, put differently, that the posterior correspondence
is language independent.
Lemma 8.1. Let π, π′ ∈ Π with π ∼ π′. Then, for every i ∈ N, Qπi = Qπ
′
i .
Proof. Since π ∼ π′, for every i ∈ N there is a bijection ψi : Sπi → Sπ
′
i such that, for
every ω ∈ Ω, for every s ∈ Sπ, π′(ψ(s)|ω) = π(s|ω).
Let (ω, s) ∈ Hπ and i ∈ N.
We have that (ω′, s′) ∈ P πi (ω, s) if and only if (ω′, s′) ∈ Hπ and s′i = si if and only if
(ω′, ψ(s′)) ∈ Hπ′ and ψi(s′i) = ψi(si) if and only if (ω′, ψ(s′)) ∈ P π
′
i (ω, ψ(s)).
Let (ω′, λ′) ∈ Qπ′i (ω, ψ (s)). Then, by the definition of Qπ
′
i , there is (ω
′, ψ (s′)) ∈
P π
′
i (ω, ψ (s)) with λ
′ψ(s
′)
= λ′. As shown in the previous paragraph, this implies (ω′, s′) ∈
P πi (ω, s) and λ
s′ = λ′
ψ(s′)
= λ′. It follows that (ω′, λ′) ∈ Qπ (ω, s) and therefore
Qπ
′
i (ω, ψ (s)) ⊆ Qπi (ω, s).
Since ∼ is reflexive, we also have that Qπi (ω, s) ⊆ Qπ
′
i (ω, ψ (s)) .
We argued in Example 7.6 that the communication strategy π is “more informative” for
receiver 1 than communication strategy π′. We now give a precise definition of being more
informative.
Definition 8.2. Let σ ∈ Σ and π, π′ ∈ Π(σ). The communication strategy π′ is at least
as informative as π if for all i ∈ N it holds that
(i) for all Q′ ∈ Qπ′i there exists Q ∈ Qπi such that Q′ ⊆ Q,
(ii) for all Q ∈ Qπi , Q′ ∈ Qπ
′
i with Q ∩Q′ 6= ∅ it holds that Q′ ⊆ Q.
Moreover, π and π′ are equally informative if π is at least as informative as π′ and vice
versa; π′ is more informative than π if π′ is at least as informative as π and not equally
informative.
It is easily verified that the notion of being at least as informative is transitive. Our
second observation serves as a sanity check: two communication strategies should be
equally informative if and only if they induce the same posterior history. And this is true.
Lemma 8.3. Let σ ∈ Σ and π, π′ ∈ Π(σ). Then π and π′ are equally informative if and
only if Qπi = Qπ
′
i .
Proof. Clearly, if Qπi = Qπ
′
i then π and π
′ are equally informative. For the other direction,
assume that π and π′ are equally informative. As π′ is as informative as π, for all Q′ ∈ Qπ′i
there is Q ∈ Qπi such that Q′ ⊆ Q. As Q′ ∩ Q 6= ∅ and as π is as informative as π′, it
must hold that Q ⊆ Q′, i.e., Q′ = Q. Thus, Qπ′i ⊆ Qπi . Using the same arguments one
finds Qπi ⊆ Qπ
′
i .
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Two further observations on informativeness that are worth mentioning here. First, if π′
is at least as informative as π, then Λπ
′ ⊆ Λπ. Second, and an immediate consequence of
Lemmas 8.1 and 8.3, equivalent communication strategies are equally informative. This
is in line with our interpretation of equivalent communication strategies as using different
languages: if the same messages were conveyed in different languages, one would not
expect them to become more or less informative.
Example 8.4. Recall the communication strategies π and π′ from Examples 4.2 and 4.4.
The posterior history correspondences of π and π′ were derived in Example 7.6. Note
that Λπ = Λπ
′
and that π, π′ ∈ Πm. Thus, Proposition 7.8 implies that, for every i ∈ N ,
Qπi and Qπ
′
i are partitions of the same set. More precisely, they are given as
Qπ1 =
{{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 0
))}
,
{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))}}
,
Qπ2 =
{{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
))}
,
{(
Y,
(
1
2
, 0
))}
,
{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))}}
,
Qπ′1 =
{{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 0
))
,
(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))}}
,
Qπ′2 =
{{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
))}
,
{(
Y,
(
1
2
, 0
))}
,
{(
X,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))
,
(
Y,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))}}
.
It holds that Qπ1 is a finer partition than Qπ
′
1 and that Qπ2 = Qπ
′
2 . Thus, π is more
informative than π′. 4
Note that we do not require Qπi and Qπ
′
i to be partitions in order to compare π and π
′.
Nevertheless, if they are partitions, then π′ is more informative than π if the restriction
of Qπi to Λπ
′
is coarser than Qπ′i .
Proposition 8.5. Let σ ∈ Σ, π, π′ ∈ Π(σ), and Λπ′ ⊆ Λπ. If π ∈ Πd, then π′ is at least
as informative as π.
Proof. By Corollary 7.10 and Lemma 8.1 we can assume without loss of generality that
π ∈ Π`, so that Qπi = Pπi for all i ∈ N .
Let i ∈ N . Assume Q ∈ Qπi and Q′ ∈ Qπ
′
i are such that Q ∩ Q′ 6= ∅. We first
show Condition (ii) of Definition 8.2, i.e., Q′ ⊆ Q. Let (ω∗, λ∗) ∈ Q ∩ Q′. There is
(ω, λ) ∈ Hπ such that Q = Qπi (ω, λ) = P πi (ω, λ). Thus, by Lemma 7.3, we have that
Q = P πi (ω
∗, λ∗) . Consider
(
ω̄, λ̄
)
∈ Q′. There is (ω′, s′) ∈ Hπ′ such that Q′ = Qπ′i (ω′, s′)
and there is (ω′′, s′′) ∈ P π′i (ω′, s′) with λ′
s′′
= λ̄. In particular, since s′′i = s
′
i, we have
λ̄i = λ
′s′′
i = λ
′s′
i = λ
∗
i . Since Λ
π′ ⊆ Λπ, we have
(
ω̄, λ̄
)
∈ Λπ, and since λ̄i = λ∗i , we have(
ω̄, λ̄
)
∈ P πi (ω∗, λ∗) = Q. We have shown that Q′ ⊆ Q.
In order to prove Condition (i) of Definition 8.2 it is now sufficient to show that for
each Q′ ∈ Qπ′i there is Q ∈ Qπi with Q ∩ Q′ 6= ∅. Let (ω′, s′) ∈ Hπ
′
be such that
Q′ = Qπ
′
i (ω
′, s′) . It holds that (ω′, λ′
s′
) ∈ Q′ ⊆ Λπ′ ⊆ Λπ. Thus, there is Q ∈ Qπi with
(ω′, λ′
s′
) ∈ Q.
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Proposition 8.5 reveals that among those communication strategies that induce the same
distribution over posterior belief vectors, those that are direct and have the largest number
of posterior histories are the least informative. We can interpret the condition Λπ
′ ⊆ Λπ
as π′ providing additional information about what posterior histories are impossible. It is
worth mentioning that this condition together with the directness of π implies that Qπ′i
contains at least the same number of elements as Qπi and that these elements are smaller
in the sense of set inclusion.
Consider π, π′ ∈ Πd that satisfy the conditions of Proposition 8.5. In this case Λπ′ ( Λπ
would prevent π from being at least as informative as π′. Thus the following corollary is
immediate.
Corollary 8.6. Let σ ∈ Σ and π, π′ ∈ Πd(σ). If Λπ′ = Λπ, then π and π′ are equally
informative. If Λπ
′ ( Λπ, then π′ is more informative than π.
In Corollary 5.10 a communication strategy is transformed into an LICS that induces the
same distribution over posterior vectors. Although they are not equivalent if π is not
direct, they have the same set of posterior histories as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 8.7. Let ∆(Ω)n ⊆ S and π ∈ Π. For π` as defined in (7) it holds that Λπ` = Λπ.
Proof. Observe that (ω, λ) ∈ Λπ if and only if there is s ∈ Sπ such that λ = λs and
π (s|ω) > 0. This, however, is equivalent to π` (λ|ω) =
∑
s∈Sπ :λs=λ π (s|ω) > 0, which
holds if and only if (ω, λ) ∈ Hπ` = Λπ` .
Proposition 8.5 and Lemma 8.7 immediately imply the following result.
Corollary 8.8. Let ∆(Ω)n ⊆ S, π ∈ Π, and π` ∈ Π` as defined in (7). Then π is at least
as informative as π`.
Corollary 8.8 suggests that using language independent communication strategies reveals
as little information as possible. The following example demonstrates that this is, in
general, not true.
Example 8.9. Recall π and π′ from Example 6.6. Both communication strategies are
language independent and, hence, direct. However, as shown in Example 7.1, Λπ
′
= Hπ
′ (
Hπ = Λπ. Thus, by Proposition 8.5, π′ is more informative than π. Observe that it is not
relevant that π is an LICS: when translating each message sent under π in two different
languages and sending both with equal probability, we obtain a communication strategy
that is not even minimal, but equally informative as π. 4
Our final result identifies those communication strategies that are least informative. Let
σ ∈ Σ and recall that the set P (σ) is convex. The relative interior of P (σ) is defined as
relint (P (σ)) = {p ∈ P (σ)| ∀p′ ∈ P (σ), ∃α > 1, αp+ (1− α)p′ ∈ P (σ)} .
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Proposition 8.10. Let ∆(Ω)n ⊆ S, σ ∈ Σ, and π ∈ Π(σ). For every p ∈ P (σ), define
the communication strategy π(p) ∈ Π` by
π (λ|ω) = p(ω, λ)
λ0(ω)
, ω ∈ Ω, λ ∈ R(σ).
If p ∈ relint (P(σ)) , then π is at least as informative as π(p).
Proof. For every p ∈ P (σ), it holds that Λπ(p) = {(ω, λ) ∈ Ω × R(σ)|p(ω, λ) > 0}. If
p ∈ relint (P(σ)) , then, for every p′ ∈ P (σ), Λπ(p′) ⊆ Λπ(p), so by Corollary 8.6 it holds
that π(p′) is at least as informative as π(p).
Let π` ∈ Π` be as defined in (7) and define p′ ∈ P (σ) by
p′(ω, λ) = λ0(ω)π`(λ|ω), ω ∈ Ω, λ ∈ R(σ).
It follows from Corollary 8.8 that π is at least as informative as π` = π(p′), so at least as
informative as π(p) for every p ∈ relint (P (σ)) .
9 Conclusion
This paper considers a Bayesian persuasion framework with multiple receivers and inves-
tigates (i) the inducible distributions of posterior belief vectors and (ii) informativeness
of communication strategies. The sender can restrict attention to particular classes of
communication strategies without loss of generality. In particular, any distribution over
posterior belief vectors can be induced by a language independent communication strat-
egy. Moreover, any direct communication strategy can be transformed into an equivalent
LICS.
Extending Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) by assuming multiple receivers and private
communication imposes further constraints on inducible distributions over posterior belief
vectors, so that Bayes plausibility is no longer a sufficient condition. We formulate the
additional conditions in the form of a linear system of equations that needs to have a
non-negative solution. These conditions, together with Bayes plausibility, are necessary
and sufficient.
We define informativeness in terms of knowledge about the true posterior history. In
general, direct and language independent communication strategies are less informative
than others. Any element in the relative interior of the set of all language independent
communication strategies which induce a particular distribution belongs to the set of least
informative communication strategies.
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